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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTIONS AND THE ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY WAS 
UNCORROBORATED 
A. Introduction 
In short, Appellant asserts that Stone was an accomplice to murder so his 
testimony must be corroborated. His own testimony established he helped during 
the commission of the murder in addition to helping afterwards. 
However, even if Stone was not an accomplice to murder, but only an 
accomplice to failure to report a death to coroner or law enforcement and 
conspiracy to commit that crime, all of his testimony still needs to be 
corroborated. 
The state provides no authority for its proposition that there must be 
perfect parity of crimes between the defendant and accomplice in order to invoke 
the accomplice corroboration requirement. Stone had also been charged with 
murder, and it was only his self-serving statement which exculpated himself from 
the murder charge while at the same time inculpated Mr. Capone for the murder. 
Thus, to not require corroboration on the charge Stone exculpated himself from 
would defeat the reason for the accomplice corroboration requirement, to wit, 
accomplices lie to get themselves out of trouble and blame others. 
There is also no evidence corroborating Stone's story. When his testimony 
and his interpretation of the evidence are removed, as they must be, what is left 
does not corroborate his story. Further, even assuming arguendo that there is 
sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to have found that Rachael was 
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dead or even that Mr. Capone killed her, there was zero remaining evidence 
upon which the jury could have found that it was murder, much less first degree 
murder. 
B. Stone was an accomplice to murder 
First, the state argues Stone is not an accomplice to all three crimes so 
his testimony related to first degree murder need not be corroborated. In short, 
the state is wrong because by his own admission Stone did help while Mr. 
Capone was supposedly committing the murder. 
Again, the pattern jury instruction defines accomplice as follows: 
An accomplice is a person who intends to promote or assist in the 
commission of a crime and who either directly commits the acts 
constituting the crime or who, before or during its commission, aids, 
assists, facilitates, promotes, encourages, counsels, solicits, 
invites, helps or hires another to commit the crime. Mere presence 
at, acquiescence in, or silent consent to, the planning or 
commission of a crime is not [in the absence of a duty to act] 
sufficient to make one an accomplice. 
ICJI 313. 
Contrary to the state's argument which simply ignores Stone's own 
testimony of what he did to help, Stone was not merely a bystander to the 
murder. Stone testified on that Friday evening he heard a loud noise and walked 
out of the shop and saw Mr. Capone on top of Rachael strangling her. (Tr. p. 
1781.) According to Stone, Rachael was still alive (she was moving a little). (Tr. 
p. 1782.) Stone testified Mr. Capone told him to go into the shop and get a tarp. 
(Tr. p. 1784.) Stone testified he went into the shop and found a tarp, but it was 
in the loft area which he couldn't reach without a ladder. (Tr. p. 1785.) He went 
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back outside and Mr. Capone was still on top of Rachael strangling her, but she 
was not moving. (Tr. p. 1787.) Stone testified that he told Mr. Capone there 
were a couple tarps up top and "[w]hat do you want me to do?" Tr. p. 1787, In. 
22. 
So when Stone first came upon them, Rachael was still alive so ipso facto, 
it was during the alleged commission of the murder which had not yet been 
completed. Then, Stone was not merely present or silently consented, he 
affirmatively tried to help by going to get a tarp and was only thwarted because 
he couldn't get up to the loft. Simply put, he was an accomplice to murder. 
More to the point, the state actually charged Stone with first degree 
murder and established probable cause for this charge when he was bound over 
on it. If the state had not needed Stone's testimony to use against Mr. Capone it 
cannot seriously be believed that the state would not be arguing that Stone was 
also guilty of murder due to his participation. 
C. Even if Stone was not an accomplice to murder, his testimony still 
must be corroborated because it exculpates him of murder and 
inculpates Mr. Capone 
The state grudgingly admits Stone was an accomplice to the charges of 
failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death and conspiracy to commit 
failure to notify coroner or law enforcement of death. 1 (Respondent's brief, p. 
21.) The state then argues since Stone was not an accomplice to murder, that 
1 The state also appears to concede that Stone was an accessory after the fact 
to murder. (Respondent's brief, p. 15.) 
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the corroboration requirement was not applicable to Mr. Capone's murder 
charge, but only to the other charges. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Stone was not an accomplice to 
the murder itself, this does not mean there is no corroboration requirement when 
he blames Mr. Capone for the murder while exculpating himself from it. 
The state provides no authority for its proposition that a co-defendant's 
testimony can be parsed out between that which concerns like charges with the 
defendant and thus must be corroborated and testimony which concerns crimes 
of which he was exculpated by his own word and thus need not be corroborated. 
This clearly cannot be correct, particularly given that the very reason for the 
corroboration requirement is because accomplices lie and blame others to help 
themselves. Again, Stone was charged and bound over for murder, and it was 
only his statement that removed criminal liability from himself for murder and 
placed it solely on Mr. Capone. 
Instructive is State v. Emmons, 94 Idaho 605 (1972), where the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained the purpose of the accomplice corroboration 
requirement. 
The Oregon Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Carr, supra, 
wherein a criminal conviction was reversed because it was based 
on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, contains a clear 
statement of the purpose of a statute such as I. C. § 19-2117: 
"* * * This statute [essentially the same as I.C. § 19-2117] 
absolutely prohibits a conviction in a criminal case upon the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, even although 
[sic] the jury may believe such testimony to be entirely true, 
and that it establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It proceeds upon the theory that 
experience in the administration of the criminal law has 
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shown the sources of such testimony to be generally so 
corrupt as to render it unworthy of belief, and that it is 
therefore better as a matter of public policy to forbid a 
conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice, although the guilty may thereby sometimes 
. escape punishment, than to leave it possible for the 
conviction of an innocent person on such testimony. 
Whether this rule of law is wise or unwise is not for us to 
inquire. It is so written, and must be applied by the court * * 
*." 42 P. at 216. 
Id. p. 609. 
In short, given the purpose of the accomplice corroboration requirement, 
which is that accomplices lie to help themselves and do it by placing the blame 
on others, Appellant asserts that determining whether one is an accomplice is not 
a narrow test focusing solely on whether that person was charged, or remains 
charged, with the exact same crimes. Rather, consideration of the accomplice's 
participation in the same criminal episode (and his motive to lie about said 
participation) is what is important, particularly where the only evidence 
exculpating the accomplice from one or more of the charges is his own word. 
D. The murder and Mr. Capone's connection to it were not 
corroborated 
In its brief, Respondent claims "[t]he state presented sufficient evidence to 
corroborate Mr. Stone's testimony and establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
essential elements of all of the charged crimes." Respondent's brief p. 12. A 
review of what the state claims is corroborating evidence shows it completely and 
utterly fails to establish first degree murder. 
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For example, the state points to evidence that suggests that Rachael was 
at Mr. Capone's shop that Friday, that she was dead, and that he was upset after 
her disappearance.2 
Even assuming arguendo there is sufficient circumstantial evidence for the 
jury to find that Rachael is dead, or even that Mr. Capone killed her, there is zero 
evidence aside from Stone upon which the jury could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it was murder, much less first degree murder. 
The state argues that Tim Fountain witnessed "a confrontation" between 
Mr. Capone and a woman outside of his shop. This does not tell the whole story. 
Mr. Fountain testified that the woman was confronting Mr. Capone and he was 
responding calmly. Specifically, Tim Fountain testified that the Yukon rapidly 
approached the shop and slightly skidded to a stop and a woman got out flailing 
her arms and hollering at Mr. Capone, but his reaction was very calm. (Tr. p. 
1697, 1705.) The woman approached right up into his face shouting at him and 
when she would take a breath occasionally he would answer smoothly. (Tr. p. 
1697, 1705.) Mr. Fountain testified that Mr. Capone walked back to his shop and 
she followed and continued to scold him. (Tr. p. 1705.) 
This in itself strongly suggests that even if Mr. Capone did kill Rachael, the 
killing would not have constituted first degree murder. Of course, simply killing 
someone does not make it murder, it can be self-defense, involuntary 
2 Incidentally, Mr. Capone did not tell Captain Hally that he had been stalking 
and harassing Rachael. Captain Hally testified that Mr. Capone told him that he 
and Rachael were playing a stupid game and they had made spoof.com calls to 
each other. (Tr. p. 1185-7.) In other words, Captain Hally construed that as 
stalking and harassing. Mr. Capone did not literally admit to stalking and 
harassing. 
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manslaughter, or voluntary manslaughter if acting under the heat of passion or 
sudden quarrel. But even if it is murder, there is no corroborating evidence it 
was a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. In short, Stone provided the 
only evidence that could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Capone 
killed Rachael, that it was murder, and that it was first degree murder. 
E. There was no corroborating evidence connecting Mr. Capone to the 
crimes of failure to report a death and conspiracy to do so 
The state concedes that Stone was an accomplice to the crimes of failure 
to notify coroner or law enforcement of death and conspiracy to commit that 
offense, but then argues that there was evidence corroborating Stone's testimony 
that Mr. Capone had committed those offenses as well. 
The problem with the state's argument is that it does not actually remove 
Stone's testimony from the mix when determining whether it was corroborated. 
The relevant pattern jury instruction provides as follows: 
Corroborative evidence is evidence of some act or fact related to 
the offense which, if believed, by itself and without any aid, 
interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice 
tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense 
charged. 
However, it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be 
sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged, 
or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies. 
In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you 
must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been 
removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is 
any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense. 
7 
If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect 
defendant with the commission of the offense, the testimony of the 
accomplice is not corroborated. 
If there is such independent evidence which you believe, then the 
testimony of the accomplice is corroborated. 
ICJI 314 (emphasis added). 
A few easy examples of the flaw in the state's argument are shown by the 
following passage from the state's brief where the (underlined) testimony of 
Stone must be removed to determine whether the remaining evidence connects 
the defendant to the offense: 
Mr. Stone also testified that Capone instructed him to get a chain. 
(9/9/14 Tr., p. 1801, L. 23 - p. 1803, L. 17.) Mr. Stone went to his 
place of work, the City of Moscow, and got a long chain from a 
scrap iron pile. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1806, L. 8 - p. 1816, L. 13; Exs. 121 -
124, 139.) Capone and Mr. Stone used that chain to help wrap 
Rachael's body in the tarp. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1817, L. 23 - p. 1821, L. 
§j 
Rick Benjamin, a fleet supervisor with the City of Moscow, testified 
the city has a scrap iron pile where old tire chains are placed, and 
they do not take inventory of that scrap iron. (9/11/14 Tr., p. 2115, 
L. 14 -p. 2117, L. 5.) 
The day after the murder, Mr. Stone and Capone met at Shari's 
restaurant. (9/9/14 Tr., p. 1838, L. 9 - p. 1840, L. 2.) During this 
meal Capone reminded Mr. Stone to keep his mouth shut about 
Rachael's death. (Id.) The state introduced into evidence a receipt 
showing that Mr. Stone paid for breakfast at Shari's Restaurant at 
11:11 a.m. Saturday, April 17, 2010. (Ex. 150.) 
Respondent's brief, p. 24 (emphasis added). 
Obviously, when Stone's aid, interpretation or direction is removed, the 
remaining evidence is innocuous like the city has scrap chains or Stone had 
breakfast, neither one of which suggests, much less establishes, that a crime 
occurred or that Mr. Capone committed it. 
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II. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT FOR ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY 
First, the state argues that since the accomplice corroboration 
requirement is statutory, it cannot be the basis for fundamental error. While 
Idaho has enacted a special statute regarding accomplice testimony, its very 
purpose is to ensure that all elements of the crime are found by the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, it is Mr. Capone's due process rights which are violated 
by the failure to instruct the jury as to the corroboration requirement. See, In Re: 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In other words, since Mr. Capone's convictions 
could only be based on Stone's uncorroborated testimony, they were not based 
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Second, the state claims that the error was not clear from the record 
because it was not clear that Stone was an accomplice or that counsel's failure to 
request an accomplice corroboration instruction was not a tactical decision. Both 
are red herrings. 
As discussed above, it is clear that Stone was an accomplice and the 
state's novel idea that he is not is what is far from clear. As to the failure to 
request the accomplice corroboration instruction, the state argues that counsel 
may have not requested it because the defense was that Stone was lying and no 
crime had been committed. This is absurd. An instruction to the jury specifically 
instructing it to remove Stone's testimony and look for independent corroborating 
evidence is perfectly consistent with the defense theory that Stone was lying and 
no crime was committed, not somehow inconsistent with it. 
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However, it does not even matter if defense counsel intentionally did not 
want that instruction. If that was the case, it was not an unreviewable legitimate 
tactical decision, but rather was based on a misunderstanding of the law because 
the failure to instruct the jury of the corroboration requirement made it easier for 
Mr. Capone to be convicted. 
Finally, the state argues there is sufficient corroboration and any error was 
harmless. For all the reasons discussed in Appellant's opening brief and above, 
this is not correct. 
Ill. THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING I.RE. 404(b) EVIDENCE 
A. The evidence of Mr. Capone's federal firearms arrest is 
inadmissible I.RE. 404(b) evidence 
The state is wrong about the court's ruling on the May 6, 2010, arrest. At a 
motion hearing on April 9, 2014, the state argued the evidence that Mr. Capone 
was arrested on May 6, 2010, was relevant because it was contextual as to why 
Mr. Capone was taken down to the police department and why there were 
federal agents there when he made a statement. (Tr. 4/19/2014, p. 56.) 
Since the court suppressed the statements from May 6, 2010, there could 
be no reason why the jury needed to know that he was arrested on that day since 
it was for the federal felon in possession charge which had nothing to do with the 
murder charge. 
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B. The state's theory that Mr. Capone was afraid of being turned in for 
guns makes no sense and was a pretextual way to introduce his 
felon status 
Contrary to the state's recharacterization of Appellant's argument, he is 
not asserting that the court must find sufficient evidence of the motive for the 
murder. Rather, Appellant is arguing that the state's ostensible motive for the 
murder, to wit, that Mr. Capone was afraid Rachael might turn him in because he 
had a gun, made no sense under the circumstances of the case (and was also 
unsupported). Thus, evidence of his felon status was not relevant, in that it could 
not make any fact of consequence any more or less likely. Rather, the state's 
theory was merely a pretext in which to place bad character evidence before the 
jury. 
The state did not argue below, as it does for the first time on appeal, that 
evidence of his arrest for possession of a gun was admissible because it 
concerned his legal problems regarding guns. Instead, the state argued only that 
it offered context to his statements which were then suppressed, and expressly 
stated that it would not be eliciting testimony about the underlying gun charges 
from the witnesses (but an inmate nevertheless testified to this). Further, 
Rachael did not turn him in because of guns so there was absolutely no 
connection between that arrest and the instant crime. 
While the fact that Mr. Capone was incarcerated may well have been 
relevant because of the jailhouse snitches, the reason for it (felon in possession 
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of a firearm) was not. As argued by defense counsel, the jury would just assume 
he was incarcerated on the murder charge. 
C. The alleged prior act of violence was inadmissible I.RE. 404(b) 
evidence 
As to evidence of Mr. Capone's alleged prior act of violence against 
Rachael (attempted strangulation}, again, the court did not perform the two tier 
I.RE. 404(b) analysis including whether there was sufficient proof that a prior act 
of violence even occurred. The charges were dismissed and even the state 
admits that Mr. Capone stated repeatedly that there was no physical altercation, 
but instead there was an accident. 
The state next argues that the I.RE. 404(b) evidence of the physical 
altercation was relevant to provide context to the supposed admissions made by 
Mr. Capone that Rachael was not coming back to testify against him in the 
attempted strangulation case. This is circular, the state is arguing that I.RE. 
404(b) evidence is admissible to provide context for the I.RE. 404(b) evidence. 
The state also argues another ostensible grounds for its admission, that it 
is relevant to motive. The state argues that the physical altercation is what 
caused their separation and without the separation, Rachael would not have 
been at Mr. Capone's shop on the day in question. This is not motive, but seems 
like an attempt at establishing proximate cause. The actual motive according to 
the state is Rachael divorcing him, not the remote reason for the divorce. 
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IV. THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW TWO DIFFERENT 
STATE'S WITNESSES TO BE IMPEACHED WITH THEIR LESS THAN 
10 YEAR OLD BURGLARY CONVICTIONS 
The state concedes that burglary and robbery are somewhat less relevant 
to credibility than say, purgery. The state also concedes that I.RE. Rule 609 
requires a case by case analysis is required to determine whether burglary is 
relevant to credibility. 
While detailed in Appellant's opening brief, Appellant will repeat the state's 
entire argument from below, which is simply declaring the burglary convictions 
are not relevant to credibly with absolutely no reasoning or basis. 
As to Voss, the state's entire argument was "[t]he fact that Mr. Voss has a 
prior burglary conviction from 2010 is not relevant to his credibility and not 
admissible." (R. p. 485.) 
The state's entire argument as to Glass was: 
The State submits that none of these convictions are relevant to 
credibility, and all but the 2006 First Degree Burglary conviction are 
more than ten (10) years old. Consequently, evidence of these 
convictions is not admissible. 
State's Motions in Limine, p. 12. (R. p. 486.) 
At the hearing on April 19, 2014, the state's argument about why the 
burglary convictions should not be permitted for impeachment was as follows: 
Thank you. Your Honor, .... to decide which felonies come in, 
obviously there are three different levels of types of crimes that the 
Court can consider, whether they're relevant or not. The first would 
be perjury. That, of course, is clearly admissible as impeachment 
evidence. The next category would be one such as robbery and 
burglary, under State vs. Ybarra and State vs. Pierce, and the 
State's argument is that a burglary conviction from 2010 does not fit 
under the issue of whether the witness is credible or not, and so 
feels that it would be barred based on Idaho Rule of Evidence 609. 
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Tr. 4/19/2014, p. 11, In. 15-p. 12, In. 1 (emphasis added). 
The court's written order on the motions in limine also simply declares the 
convictions not relevant with absolutely no reasoning or basis: 
The state's motion in limine to prohibit the defense from mentioning 
or introducing evidence of Joshua Voss' criminal history (a 2010 
conviction for Burglary, misdemeanor theft, and probation 
violations) is granted. Such evidence is not relevant to the witness' 
credibility. 
The state's motion in limine to prohibit the defense from mentioning 
or introducing evidence of Brent Glass' criminal history (a 2006 
conviction for Burglary, and 4 other felony convictions that occurred 
more than 10 years ago) is granted. Such evidence is not relevant 
to the witness' credibility. 
Order Re: Motions in Limine, p. 1. (R. p. 1571.) 
The district court did not acknowledge Idaho law which holds that burglary 
can be relevant to credibility, much less conduct a case by case analysis. The 
same is true as to whether the 2002 burglary conviction was too remote or not. 
The court simply ignored the provision in I.R.E. 609 providing that the 10 year 
limit runs from the conviction or release from custody on the conviction. 
V. THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
To flesh out the facts surrounding this issue, on March 9, 2015, law 
enforcement obtained a statement from Tyler Byer, who had been housed in the 
same jail cell as David Stone in the Latah County Jail in July of 2013. Tyler Byer 
reported that Stone said they would never find the body (Rachael Anderson's) in 
the river because it was not there. Mr. Byer was being booked for DUI by a 
deputy and was drunk. However, Lieutenant Besst talked to Mr. Byer the next 
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day at his place of employment and he confirmed the statement. (Augmentation, 
p. 7.) 
Back to the point, Stone's statement that Rachael's body was not in the 
river was not hearsay because it was an admission of a party opponent. I.RE. 
801(d)(2). 
The state's own argument shows it is a statement of a co-conspirator. 
I.RE. 801(d)(2)(E). The state points out that in order to be a co-conspirator 
statement the declaration must be while the conspiracy is actually in progress 
and in furtherance of it. The state also argues that the statement is not 
substantive because when he made it, Stone was still living his lie about his 
involvement with Rachael's disappearance. The state opines "[t]his lying would 
presumably include lying about Rachael's body not being in the river-especially if 
that is where it was." Respondent's brief at p. 54. 
To begin with, whether or not a declarant is still lying does not determine 
whether a statement is substantive or not. But more to the point, the conspiracy 
to not report Rachael's death is a continuing conspiracy which can extend after 
arrest. Under the state's theory, Stone's statement was in furtherance of the 
conspiracy because it was made to throw off the discovery of the body by 
having the investigation look elsewhere. While the parties only learned of the 
statement after trial, Stone actually made it in July of 2013 prior to even the 
preliminary hearing when he was still charged with murder.3 
3 This is why Stone can be also considered a party and his statement admitted 
against him under I.RE. 801 (d)(2)(A). 
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CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons and those in his opening brief, Mr. Capone requests 
this Court reverse and vacate his convictions due to insufficient evidence, or in 
the alternative, to reverse and vacate his convictions and remand this matter for 
a new trial. f 
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